很难评估巴拉诺斯基对SdA的实际成就的信念。一方面，她似乎对SdA组织的大量事件印象深刻。例如，作者引用了该项目可能膨胀的统计数据，到1938年(2004年，56,110年)，该项目在1935年之前改善了超过17000家公司，超过了33,700家公司。她解释了这一明显的雇主志愿精神，以配合SdA的建议，即企业要感谢政府对工会的破坏，但在20世纪30年代中期，组织实际上是在竞争工党(Baranowski 2004,112)。因此，巴拉诺夫斯基认为，雇主们自己也认为，工厂的改善将是吸引劳动力的一个重要因素。巴拉诺斯基似乎很少关注公司合作的第三个可能原因，即人们认为和期望的生产率提高，这是由于改善了工厂环境，并增加了工人的善意。汤姆·梅森(Tom Mason)声称，尽管很可能是很短的一段时间(1966年，120年)，但还是有这样的提升。因此，在遵守SdA的建议时，公司可能会考虑到这一点。
It is fairly difficult to assess what Baranowski believes about the actual achievements of the SdA. On the one hand she seems impressed by the sheer number of events that SdA managed to organize. For example, the author quotes the program’s likely inflated statistic that it improved over 17,000 companies by as early as 1935 and over 33,700 companies by 1938 (2004, 56, 110). She explains this apparent employers’ volunteerism to cooperate with SdA’s suggestions with the fact that businesses were grateful to the regime for the destruction of unions, but also that in the mid-1930s organizations were actually competing for labour (Baranowski 2004, 112). Thus, Baranowski suggests that employers themselves considered that making factory improvements would be an important factor for attracting workforce. Baranowski seems to have paid little attention to the third likely reason for corporate cooperation – the perceived and desired boost of productivity that would come as a result of improved factory environment and increased goodwill on the workers’ side. Tom Mason claims that there was such a boost though it was likely a very short term one (1966, 120). Thus, it is possible that corporations took that into account when complying with SdA’s proposals.