本研究将重点放在单一的自愿披露，盈余管理的预测，大多涉及到投资者的收益预测。直接链接管理盈余预测和结果可以减少信息不对称和测试信息披露质量与权益资本成本提供了巨大的机会。
进一步的相关问题是盈余质量如何影响公司的披露决策分析。信息质量差的公司将发行更多/更便宜的信息披露，因为信息不对称的公司和投资者之间的公司。另一项研究表明，随着信息质量的提高，管理者有更多的信息披露的动机。因此，公司的穷人/良好的盈利质量披露/更昂贵的披露，因为投资者会认为这披露少/更可靠。（Verrecchia [ 1990）。当被告知的概率增加披露的概率也增加，市场解读为坏消息保密并因此降低了公司的价值
新西兰会计学论文代写:盈余管理
The present study will focus on single voluntary disclosure, management forecast of earnings, which mostly related to payoffs forecasts for investors. The direct link of management earnings forecasts and payoffs allows reducing information asymmetry and provide great opportunity to test disclosure quality and cost of equity capital.
The further related issue is analysis of how earnings quality influences companies’ disclosure decision. The firm with poor/good information quality will issue more/less expensive disclosure because information asymmetry is high/less between firm and investors of that firm. Another studies show that as information quality increases managers have the motivation to disclose more. Hence, firms with the poor/good earnings quality disclose less/more expensive disclosure, because investors will consider this disclosure less/more reliable. (Verrecchia [1990). As the probability of being informed increases the probability of disclosure also increases because market interpret nondisclosure as bad news and therefore reduce company’s value
