It has also been contended that the sanctions that the Council places on states are temporary and meant to secure compliance and as such cannot be said to establish new rules of international law. This a plausible argument due to the fact that even if the sanctions were initially temporary, they can later acquire the force of law to be made applicable to other defaulting states, hence they become custom (my argument is plausible as well). It is submitted in line with Chesterman’s argument that the Council’s decisions even if previously not legislative, have taken a radical turn for imposing obligations on states. This is true of the resolution on terrorism which requires states to pass legislations to give effect to the resolution and report to a committee about progress made on the implementation of the resolution (see szasz and the resolution on terrorism).This is in contradiction to most of its resolutions which usually encourage states to do a particular thing rather than using operative words like”shall”. This kind of obligation is usually found at the state level where you have a legislature with the requisite power and the necessary checks on its decisions or at the international level through multilateral treaties that create obligations on states with their consent.